Reputation Australia

Western observers are often frustrated by the distinctly Russian and Chinese practice of declaring that something is false when it is known to be true and vice versa. But the concept of “truth” is not universally shared. This difference is increasingly becoming a point of friction between the eastern and western hemispheres, especially in tense times.

Western concepts of truth centre on the notion that something did happen or it did not. Either it is a fact or it is not. Therefore, either it is the truth or it is not. Accompanying that is the notion of something being essentially true by its own nature. The emphasis here is on the use of the words “Western concepts”, because in China and Russia, especially today, the concept of truth is different. Against the backdrop of the Ukraine war and the worsening situation around Taiwan, the “truth” is becoming an information battlefield.

Russian and Western Truth
Who is winning the Ukraine war seems to be a matter of opinion. Russia says its military action is proceeding to plan, but the US says Ukraine is holding out with western support.

Most Russians get their news from state-controlled media, which by western standards cannot be trusted with the facts, never mind the truth. Inevitably this is a major factor in shaping contemporary Russian attitudes to their country’s invasion of Ukraine, which is generally supported, despite some well-contained dissents. In contrast, we want to assume that western media can generally be relied on for a free and independent inquiry. However, many people have a very jaundice view of the media in Australia for example, with some slamming the ABC for being hopelessly left-wing while others condemn commercial media for propagating the conservative Murdoch agenda. It depends on one’s point of view and whether a particular media outlet’s depiction of events tallies with one’s own attitudes and values.

In reality, as Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu said, “all warfare is based on deception”. Both Moscow and Washington are engaged in psychological warfare, which is key to winning the overall war in Ukraine.

Both sides are propagating their own version of the facts, while censoring counterclaims, as each seeks to maintain an appearance of progress to justify the cost and loss.

While Russian media is forced to recite the official line, Western media has a choice but chooses to favour NATO and Pentagon briefs and report them almost unconditionally. According to Marwan Bishara (2022), former professor of International Relations at the American University of Paris, there are statements being carried in mainstream media from the Pentagon (sometimes unattributed) declaring that “Russia has committed nearly 85 percent of its military to the war in Ukraine” and “has removed military coverage from other areas on their border and around the world”; Russia “still has not figured out how to use combined arms effectively”; Russia is “taking hundreds of casualties a day”. What are their sources? Can they be demonstrated? These statements appear to go to print and to air on the assumption that they must be true.

“Now I have no clue if any of this or other such claims are true, and nor I suspect do the officials propagating it or the journalists spreading it,” said Bishara. “But it is out there, shaping the opinions of the public, the elites and the experts, most of who believe Ukraine is able to pull off some sort of an upset if not an outright victory against its largely more powerful neighbour. But the Western and especially Anglo-American media seems to suffer from short, or should I say selective memory when it takes the official line at face value, as if the official deception during yesterday’s wars in Afghanistan, Iraq or Vietnam, has no bearing on covering today’s war in Ukraine”.

An article in the Washington Post, (Whitlock, 2019) revealed that senior US officials failed to tell the truth about the war in Afghanistan, making good-news announcements that they knew to be false and hiding unmistakable evidence that the war had become unwinnable.

Official deception was even worse during the Cold War. For example, the “Pentagon Papers” fifty ago revealed that the US government concealed terrible losses in the Vietnam war, which led to some 55,000 American and more than a million Vietnamese deaths.

So when it comes to war at least, governments can and do deliberately deceive in order to confound their enemies and, into the bargain, mislead their own populations, either deliberately or incidentally.

Social media only compounds the fog of war. It is a pain-amplifier of misinformation and disinformation carried out by state actors, aided and abetted by the radical free-wheeling maelstrom of opinions and/or ravings from anyone and everyone, including disgraced former US Presidents, those peddling an agenda or cause and those employed by powerful countries to deliberately spread FUD (Fear-Uncertainty-Doubt). It is a breeding ground of falsehood, confusion and manipulation.

Chinese Truth
Ever since Chad Hansen (1985) argued that (pre-Buddhist) “Chinese philosophy has no concept of truth,” the role and nature of truth in ancient Chinese philosophy has been a hotly debate topic. Much of this debate is plagued, however, by a confusion of terms, concepts, and theories of truth.  The phrase “Seek Truth from Facts” was introduced to the People’s Republic of China as a hallmark slogan of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP’s historical narrative is a critical component of its domestic and foreign policies, as it aims to legitimize its own power and supremacy. The slogan has been used throughout the People’s Republic of China’ history, and served as a political tool in Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 speech, which allowed the Party to enact much needed reforms while maintaining its authority. The Chinese Communist Party thus pushes its narrative of history to shape and define the discourse on the Party, rule of law and foreign policy.

“Seek Truth from Facts,” has resulted in the revision of history, human dignity, and the pursuit of “adherence to the Party.” Revisionism of history such as the Sino-Japanese War, the Great Famine under Mao, China’s conquest of Tibet, the Tiananmen Square Massacre and contemporary narrative of today’s events such as the fate of Chinese Muslims (the Uyghurs), pro-Democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong, the fate of Taiwan and the presence of artificially-created islands in the South China Sea in support of China’s territorial claims – all of these are informed by the apparent license to rewrite history or portray facts in a way that fit a national agenda.

If it is the case that in certain countries, leaders assume that military objectives or foreign policy goals or a domestic political agenda provide moral loopholes through which the truth can conveniently slip, where does it leave us now? Some people will be unsure which sources can be trusted and which are to be suspected. Some might question the legitimacy of leaders – all political leaders – and doubt their motives. Many will lose confidence in the media (if they have not already) and turn to social media, which is the domain of unrestricted fake news, the unofficial, unattributed and uncorroborated.

And what of truth? It might have always been the case that we choose to believe what we want to believe. But in the cacophony of opinions, versions of the truth and the relentless drone of social media that flood our world today, the truth, irrespective of how we define it, is, as the saying goes, the first casualty of war.

Even worse, it has been upgraded, modernised and digitised into an insidious 21st Century psychological weapon of war.

References:

• Bishara, “Western media and the war on truth in Ukraine”, Al Jazeera 2022

• Whitlock, “At War With The Truth”, Washington Post (2019)

• Hansen, “Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy, and ‘Truth’,” Journal of Asian Studies 44, 3 (1985)

• Yen & Burton, “Seek Truth from Facts: The Chinese Communist Party’s War on History”, Project 2049 Institute, (2016)

Our political leaders are warning of armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific.  But there’s more to worry us than bombs alone.

Critical infrastructure (aviation, rail, telecoms, electricity, ports, etc) are always prime targets in any armed conflict.  When the Japanese hit Darwin in 1942, it was to knock out the city’s seaport and airfields and cripple its trade and defence capability.

In the Ukraine, nuclear, electric and hydro infrastructure was among the first hit.

Here, Australia’s second round of amendments to the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SOCI) came into effect earlier this year.  Now it includes data centres among critical infrastructure, recognising that they are key to our national security.  Central to the thinking behind these amendments is the steady growth in cyber attacks on Australian targets conducted by criminal individual and hostile state actors in recent years.

SOCI aims to more closely integrate the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) with private sector critical infrastructure.  Key corporations in the infrastructure space are now required to report to the ASD their assets and security and risk mitigation plans.  They must also share information on any cyber incident.

At the end of the day, it is all about data security.

All major organisations rely on data and this invariably will involve data centres.  This dependence has only increased during the COVID emergency amid the rise of remote-working and therefore the need to secure data has also grown.

The Security 2025 Report by the Australian Security Research Centre highlighted cyber vulnerabilities as a crucial element in Australia’s overall security arrangement.  It called on all governments, the private Security Industry and the corporate sector to work as a team and bring about meaningful and lasting reforms in regulations, knowledge and practice.  Afterall, many private companies work for government agencies and much of the work is conducted online. The SOCI amendments are not enough on their own and the private sector must ensure that mechanisms are in place to defend against cyber-attacks and promptly report them.  This is not merely a software solution provided by an IT professional.  Registered and licensed security professionals are needed to analyse an organisation through a security lens rather than relying on an IT professional, who might not have any kind of security clearance at all.

Critical infrastructure and security go hand in hand.

In the event of general mobilisation, critical infrastructure will be hit first but that will be more than the railway lines, ports and airfields.  Several joint cybersecurity advisories warn that key data service providers in Australia have been targeted by malicious cyber actors.

The Australian Security Industry Association Ltd (ASIAL) was one of several organisations invited to consult in the first draft of the Australian Defence Department’s General Mobilisation Design Directorate.  Together with representatives from oil and gas, logistics and transport, water and electricity infrastructure providers, representatives from the private Security Industry highlighted the need to ensure best-practice security measures at Australia’s critical infrastructure both in terms of physical protection and cyber security.

The SOCI amendments reflect that the new front in cyberwarfare is key infrastructure.  The Act has expanded the policy framework to protect valuable information needed for Australia’s continued operation.

Steve Cropper is a Strategic Communication Adviser to the Security Sector and an Information Operations Contractor to the Australian Army.

These days, there is a lot of attention on Australia’s defence readiness, but if we are seriously out-gunned by a gigantic adversary, perhaps our focus should shift to an alternative to conventional warfare – “Information Warfare”.

The freshly-minted Albanese Government last week announced an external review into Australia’s military defences and an assessment of our readiness.

The review is to be headed up by former Defence Minister Stephen Smith and the former Chief of Defence, Sir Angus Houston. Sir Angus commented on television last week that the current strategic situation is the worst he has ever known in his career or his lifetime. Sir Angus knew the Vietnam War, so his observation is revealing.

It is not unheard of for incoming Federal Governments to conduct such reviews, however the current strategic situation, grave as it is, as Sir Angus Houston points out, is clearly a trigger for a significant review right now.

Most military observers would probably agree that Australia’s submarine issue should have been worked out at least a decade ago. And issues surrounding the commissioning of Black Hawk helicopters, decommissioning them and then recommissioning them – plus a raft of other military hardware issues, takes on a greater sense of urgency when set against the backdrop of an increasingly militarised South China Sea and the brinkmanship and general posturing of China and the US. And then of course, there’s Russia in the Ukraine.

Critically, Australia’s vulnerabilities are not limited to the military. Australian businesses and government – indeed even householders are potentially targets for cyber and info warfare attacks by hostile actors both state-sponsored and misguided individuals acting for money or cheap thrills.

As highlighted in the ASIAL-commissioned Security 2025 Report, all Australian governments, the private security industry and business must work as a team if Australia is going to meet the security challenges that lie ahead. It is not just a military issue.

Leaving military hardware to one side, today, defence and security in general, increasingly revolves around technology and information. Warfare used to mean fighting over physical borders with conventional weapons. But today, the emphasis is increasingly on information warfare. Whilst conventional battles are characterised by blood, bombed cities and refugees, the other form of war might be conducted without being noticed at all.

Ask most people what information warfare is about and they will probably say that it is like propaganda – deliberately propagating a perception (either true or false), intending to engender a new certain world view on a population in order to influence their beliefs, attitudes and ultimately their behaviour. (Ellul, Jacques 1965).

A definition for information warfare is elusive. The US Defence Information Systems Agency defines it as, “…actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversary information and information systems while leveraging and protecting our information and information systems” (Takemoto 2001).

Although very advanced in theory and practice in Russia and China (and in the Ukraine too apparently, judging on recent performance), information warfare in Australia is a relative toddler.

The Navy has a nascent Information Warfare unit and the Army regularly conducts exercises with information warfare elements included, albeit it in a very low-key and under-developed fashion.

Yet the ADF still separates Public Affairs, Intelligence and PhsyOps (Psychological Operations) as three distinct functions. Fortunately, there are stirrings of a small degree of integration but they are still very much three separate functions in the three separate services (Navy, Army and RAAF).

Our military and our Government rightly shun the idea of deliberate distortion of facts for propaganda gains because “that’s what the bad guys do”. Instead, we use terms like, “Shaping the Narrative”, “Raising Awareness”, “Engagement” and other equally benign-sounding terms. We only use harsher epithets like “propaganda” when describing what certain other countries are doing. Of course, everybody knows that thinly-disguised disinformation and downright lies are being spread by certain big, bad superpowers. And it is unfair and inaccurate to suggest that Australia plays in that particular league.

But when we consider information warfare, we should look past the cruel memes, the state media-sponsored lies and blatant cover-ups that we increasingly associate with Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine for example.

Nichiporuk describes six main components of information warfare to define the concept (Nichiporuk 1999):

1. Electronic warfare, involving jamming communication systems, for example, to prevent the enemy from communicating with itself.

2. Operations security, identifying one’s own weaknesses and protecting them from attacks. This is not isolated to military weaknesses and applies equally to the private sector like banking and infrastructure – a job for the private Security Industry.

3. Deception – giving away false information to mislead the opponent. This could mean sending out the wrong coordinates for an attack in order to keep the accurate location secret.

4. Physical attack on information processes which could mean bombing communication centres for instance. Unlike the others, this is like conventional warfare because it revolves around physical attacks.

5. Information attacks, which is when technology is used to sabotage someone else’s information systems. Viruses can delete or spy on enemy systems.

6. And information operations (or PsyOps), which means affecting people’s views and opinions by different types of communication channels such as the mainstream media or social media.

There is a certain asymmetric nature to this. A tiny country, weak in military terms, can give a huge invader a bloody nose, even if it is bristling with weapons, provided it can disrupt the enemy’s weapon systems and communication channels, which are so addicted to electronics and online connectivity. Moreover, cyber attacks can be launched on an adversary from almost anywhere on the planet bringing critical infrastructure to a standstill – air traffic control, telecommunications, electricity grid etc. And crucially, the psychological elements of information operations are as available to Australia or any superpower.

Whilst there is an extensive array of information warfare tools and techniques available and any number of motivations for their use, exactly how one uses them and to what end demands careful consideration at the very highest level. The nation’s morals, values and beliefs must be reflected in any information warfare intent and actions. In other words, certain other countries might choose to conduct themselves despicably, but Australia certainly must not follow suit.

So when the report into Australia’s defence readiness is made public, assuming it ever is (and that might depend on just how shocking the findings are), we shall look with interest to see if the ADF is interested in fighting with words, images and cyber-electronic expertise – or just weapons alone.

References:
· Nichiporuk, Brian. (1999). U.S. military opportunities: information-warfare concepts of operation.
· Takemoto, Col G. H. (2001). Information Warfare in the Cyber Domain.
· Ellul, Jacques (1965). Introduction by Konrad Kellen in Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes

 Steve Cropper is an Information Operations contractor to the Australian Army and a strategic Communications adviser to the Australian Security Sector.

Interviews can be tricky sometimes, especially if the issue is a bit controversial.  So you will want to make sure you don’t get distracted and you make the most of this valuable opportunity to communicate with your audience.

In addition to our well-established in-person media training service, Reputation Australia has a self-paced online learning module called “Mastering Media Interviews”.  It is all about getting you ready for an interview and get your message across. The program has been developed by a team of journalists and PR professionals with more than 30 years experience in the field.  You can take your time and complete the program online in your own time and your own way.  And yes, it does work on a hand-held device.

The course is in three sections:

• Section 1 is about newsworthiness and discusses what reporters are looking for in news stories.
• Section 2 is focused on formulating the most successful message in terms of relevance to the audience, as well as expressing the message in a brief, concise media-friendly way.   We also concentrate on how to get that all-important message into the interview as early as possible and as often as possible.
• Section 3 covers We consider the best ways to liaise with reporters.  We also talk about our options for appeal to the media if we feel that we’ve been seriously misrepresented or given unfair treatment.

You can review any of the materials at any stage to refresh your memory on the key points.

At the end of the course, you’ll have a plan to make best use of a media interview opportunity from beginning to end.

Each lecture comes with special download materials so you will have all the tools you need.  And if you ever need more support in media relations or you would like to get in some practice runs before the interview, help and support is at hand.

This new program is available via our online learning portal.  Meanwhile, if you are interested in developing the communication skills of your team in business or the public sector, please get in touch.